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INTRODUCTION
In April 2000, Dartmouth College hosted the "Eating Out of the
Same Pot" Black Indian Conference devoted to the subject of Indian-
Black relations.' During the conference, a phenotypically Black' woman
who identified herself as Indian became involved in a verbal altercation
with an Indian man over the presence of slaves within the Cherokee
Nation.' In the heat of the argument, the woman asked why she, a
"nappy-headed" Indian, and others similarly situated were often mis-
treated by other Native Americans.'
This scenario is illuminating for several reasons. First, although much
scholarship focuses on the relationships between *Whites and African
Americans and between Whites and Native Americans, the relationships
between African Americans and Native Americans receive significantly less
attention.' The existence of the Dartmouth Black Indian Conference evi-
dences the need for firther dialogue between Native American and
African American communities, especially as pertains to individuals who
identify with both groups.
Second, the existence of persons who identify themselves as "Black
Indians"6 may, for a multitude of reasons, be a fact startling or difficult to
accept for people from a variety of ethnicities.' However, it is especially
1. Valerie J. Phillips, Seeing Each Other Through the White Man's Eyes, in CONFOUND-
ING THE COLOR LiNE 371,371 (James F. Brooks ed., 2002).
2. The terms Black and African American will be used interchangeably throughout
this Note.
3. Id. at 381.
4. Id. at 381-82.
5. JACK D. FORBES, AFRICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANs:THE LANGUAcE OF RACE AND
THE EVOLUTION OF RED-BLACK PEOPLES 1 (2d ed. 1993); KATJA MAY, AFRIcAN AMERICANS
AND NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE CREEK AND CHEROKEE NATIONS, 1830s TO 1920s, at xix
(1996);James F Brooks, Introduction, in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 1,
5.
6. For a discussion of the problems with the term "Black Indian" see Ron Wel-
burn, A Most Secret Identity: Native American Assimilation and Identity Resistance in African
America, in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 292, 306-07.
7. See generally Tiya Miles, Uncle Tom Was an Indian: Tracing the Red in Black Slavery,
in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 137, 146 ("Given the prevailing under-
standing of racial categories, many of us find the notion of Indians who are also Black
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important for dual members of the groups to understand the struggles
playing out between them. A significant number of African Americans
have Indian ancestry. Thus, what happens within Native American com-
munities directly or indirectly affects a number ofAfrican Americans.9
Third, and most important to the analysis presented here, the discus-
sion of slavery within Native American communities is insufficient. As
one scholar stated, "the popular story of slavery in America ... is a story
without American Indians in it." 10 This popular story does not include
Native Americans either as slaves or as slave owners, even though they
were both.1 This note addresses the history of Native Americans as slave
owners and its lingering effects on Black members of some Native
American tribes.
The Black descendants of African American slaves and free Blacks are
commonly known as Freedmen. 2 Historically, Freedmen within the Semi-
nole Nation"z have enjoyed many of the same benefits and privileges of
tribal membership as their non-Black counterparts, while Freedmen among
the other four "Civilized Tribes"'" have not enjoyed the same privileges as
the Seminole Freedmen and have consistently been marginalized.'5
difficult to accept."); Tanu T. Henry, Indian in the Family, Africana, at http://
www.africana.com/articles/daily/index_20010212.asp (Feb. 12, 2001) (discussing the
common practice within African American communities of poking fun at those members
who claim an Indian heritage).
8. E.g., Ron Daniels, Black Seminoles of Oklahoma Deserve Justice, African-
Native American Genealogy Forum, at http://afrigeneas.com/forume/index.cgi?noframes;
read= 112 (June 26, 1999); William Loren Katz, Africans and Indians: Only in America, at
http://williamlkatz.com/africanindians.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
9. FORBJES, supra note 5, at 190.
10. Miles, supra note 7, at 138.
11. Id. at 138-39.
12. Josephine Johnston, Resisting a Genetic Identity: The Black Seminoles and Genetic
Tests ofAncestry, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 262, 262 (2003); Circe Sturm, Blood Politics, Racial
Classification, and Cherokee National Identity: The Trials and Tribulations of the Cherokee Freed-
men, in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LN,, supra note 1, at 223, 223. While Johnston states
that the Black Seminoles are known as Freedmen, the term "Freedmen" refers to the de-
scendants of Black slaves of members of other tribes as well. See Sturm, supra. Black
Freedmen should be distinguished from those persons with mixed African American and
Native American heritage who are not necessarily descended from those who were on the
"Freedmen Rolls." See Welburn, supra note 6. While the term "Freedmen" has historically
been used to refer to any non-slave Blacks, in this context it will refer to descendants of
Black slaves and free Blacks within Indian nations.
13. While the Freedmen in nations other than the Seminole Nation have also been
treated unfairly and have similar claims to those of the Seminole Freedmen, this Note
concentrates primarily on the Seminole Freedmen due to their unique status within the
Seminole Nation and because of the recent Davis litigation.
14. The Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Nations are referred
to as "The Five Civilized Tribes." WILLIAM LOREN KATZ, BLACK INDIANS: A HIDDEN HERI-
IAGE 135 (1986) [hereinafter KAIz,BLACK INDIANS].
15. See Sturm, supra note 12, at 223-24.
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Furthermore, Seminole Freedmen traditionally have played leading roles
within the Seminole Nation.16
Recently, even the Seminole Freedmen nearly lost the privileges
they have always enjoyed. In 2000, the Seminole Nation government
decided to change the Tribe's constitution so that Freedmen would no
longer be recognized by the Seminole General Council." The new
requirement that tribal members have at least one-eighth Seminole Indian
blood effectively expelled most Freedmen from the Nation, as many were
unable to show that they possessed the requisite amount of Indian blood. 8
Although this procedure was deemed invalid in Seminole Nation v.
Norton, 9 it exemplifies the lengths to which some Indian tribes have gone
to divest Freedmen of tribal citizenship.
This Note concerns the role the government has played in the ex-
clusion of Black Freedmen from Native American nations through its
implementation and interpretation of the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity ("tribal sovereignty" or "tribal immunity"). Part I discusses the
background of the Freedmen within the Five Civilized Tribes and pro-
vides an overview of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, including
its role in the controversy concerning the status of Black Indians. Part II
discusses the interpretations given to the doctrine of tribal sovereign im-
munity by United States courts and executive agencies and the effects of
those interpretations on relations between Native Americans and Freed-
men.
Part III discusses the roles that Congress, executive agencies, and the
courts must take to halt and reverse the discriminatory practices that have
stripped Freedmen of their rights and privileges as members of Native
American communities. Specifically, this Part argues that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs ("BIA") should intervene in the case of the Cherokee
Freedmen and that Congress has the power to address the problems with
tribal immunity by appropriately limiting the boundaries of the doctrine
and strengthening the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA").2" Furthermore,
federal courts have the power to recognize a cause of action in tribal sov-
ereignty cases arising under the ICRA and the ability to protect Black
Freedmen by distinguishing their race-based claims from previously ad-
vanced gender discrimination claims.
16. Daniels, supra note 8.
17. Wilhelm Murg, The Seminole Dispute from a Freedmen's Point of View, NATIVE AM.
TIMEs,Jan. 15, 2002, at 5.
18. Johnston, supra note 12, at 262.
19. 223 F. Supp. 2d 122,147-48 (D.D.C. 2002).
20. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,25 U.S.C. § 1301-03 (2001).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Freedmen Within the Seminole Nation
The Seminole Indian Freedmen formally became members of the
Seminole Nation in 1866 when the Nation signed a treaty with the United
States government that emancipated the Freedmen and allowed them to
participate as voting members of the Tribe.2 However, evidence suggests
that there have been members of the Seminole Nation with African de-
scent since its inception. 22 The Seminole Freedmen hold a truly unique
place in the context of Indian-Black relations. While other Nations have
consistently marginalized Freedmen to varying degrees, 23 historically the
Seminole Nation has embraced persons of African descent .
4
As early as 1763, free Black slaves and fugitive slaves began to settle
among the Seminole Indians. 2' Additionally, some Seminoles purchased
slaves from Whites, received slaves as rewards from the British, or captured
slaves during their raids on the British.26 However, the form of slavery
practiced by the Seminoles differed markedly from the plantation-style
slavery commonly practiced in the southern states.27
The lifestyles of these Seminole slaves were "virtually indistinguish-
able" from those of Free Blacks who joined the Seminole communities."
Blacks soon began to intermarry within the Nation and took on leader-
ship roles in its development. 9 Seminole-owned slaves lived in villages
adjacent to those of the tribal members and were given tools to build
their own huts and seeds to plant their own crops." In return, they were
21. Aaron R. Brown, Judgments: "Brothers" Fighting Over Indian Money: The Right of
Seminole Freedmen to a Portion of the Indian Claims Commission Judgment Fund, 11 Am. IN-
DiAN L. RaEv. 111,111 (1985).
22. Natsu Taylor Saito, From Slavery and Seminoles to AIDS in South Africa, 15 VILL. L.
REv. 1135,1170 (2000).
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. KATZ, BLACK INDIANS, supra note 14, at 135 ("Only the Seminoles ... firmly
rejected bondage in favor of a system of friendship and alliance with their [B]lack mem-
bers."); MAY, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that Seminoles were most tolerant of African
Americans, while the Creeks and Cherokees were in the middle of the spectrum and the
Choctaws and Chickasaws were at the opposite end of the spectrum).
25. Johnston, supra note 12, at 263.
26. Id.
27. KENNETI WIGGINS PORTER,'ItE NEGRO ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 121 (1971)
[hereinafter PORTER,THE NEGRO].
28. Johnston, supra note 12, at 263.
29. Henry supra note 7.
30. JEFF GUINN, OUR LAND BEFORE WE DIE: THE PROUD STORY OF THE SEMINOLE
NEGRO 23 (2002).
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expected to share a small part of their harvests with their owners.3' More-
over, due to Black slaves' superior knowledge of the customs of White
men 32 and their ability to serve as interpreters and liaisons for the Indians,
they played such invaluable roles in the early days of the Nation that one
scholar said Seminole slaves "might even lay claim to being the true rulers
of the nation."33
Even though Blacks played significant roles in the everyday opera-
tions of the Nation, "[t]he Freedmen have traditionally relied on the wars
in which their ancestors fought with the Seminole Indians to explain and
validate their membership in the Seminole Nation. 3 4 Most significantly,
Black Seminoles fought side-by-side with their non-Black brethren dur-
ing the Second Seminole War, which began in 18351s and became the
longest and costliest Indian war fought against the United States. Black
Seminoles were involved so extensively that one Major remarked that the
war was a Negro war, not an Indian war.
6
Some dispute exists regarding the extent to which Black Seminoles
were allowed to participate in the Nation. While some people, including
members of the Seminole Nation, believe that Blacks within the Nation
were always on equal footing,37 others do not share that view Some scholars
argue that although Blacks had it much easier within the Seminole Nation
than within other Native American nations, they were still seen as inferior
and thus were never completely accepted by the Seminole Nation. 8
Regardless of the view taken, the Freedmen clearly have strong ties
to the Seminole Nation and therefore should be able to make compelling
claims for their inclusion as full members of the Nation. The Seminole
Nation has better integrated Blacks from the very beginning than any
other Indian Nation. Blacks within the Seminole Nation obtained higher
stature than Blacks in any of the other Five Civilized Tribes.3"
31. Id.; see William G. McLoughlin, Red Indians, Black Slavery and White Racism:
America's Slaveholding Indians, 26 Am. Q. 367,369 (1974).
32. See McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 369.
33. PORTER, ThE NEGRO, supra note 27, at 47.
34. Johnston, supra note 12, at 269.
35. See id. at 264,269.
36. Id. at 264; Saito, supra note 22, at 1156-57.
37. KENNETH W PORTER, THE BLAcKt SEMINOLES: HISTORY OF A FREEDOM-SEEKING
PEOPLE 6 (1996) ("Indeed, the relationship between the Black[] [Seminoles] and the
tribespeople might be described as primitive democratic feudalism, with basically no per-
sonal inequality between the two groups."); Mary Pierpoint,Jim Crow Legacy Still Disrupts
Oklahoma Seminoles, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 6, 2002, at D1 ("The Seminoles never
treated the people of African descent as slaves; they were really equals.").
38. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 370 ("[Elven if [B]lack slaves had a somewhat
easier and freer life among the Seminoles, they were still slaves, not equals.").
39. PORTER, THE NEGRO, supra note 27, at 44.
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B. Davis v. United States
In September of 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit dealt the Seminole Freedmen a crushing blow when it de-
cided Davis v. United States.4" The two Freedmen bands of the Seminole
Nation, the Dosar-Barkus and Bruner Bands, sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief against the United States and several government agencies
because they claimed to have been "systematically denied benefits rou-
tinely provided other members of the Tribe.
'" 41
The case centered on the release by Congress of a $56 million
judgment fund award that was granted to the Nation in payment for
Florida lands taken in 1823.2 Congress allowed the Tribe to develop its
own distribution plan for the money4 3 The General Council of the Tribe
then established programs to be funded by the award. 4 Many of those
programs required that any eligible participant "be an enrolled member of
the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma who has been determined to have
descended from a member of the Seminole Nation as it existed in Florida
on September 18, 1823.."
4
1
Eligibility requirements of this sort are highly problematic for the
Freedmen because they were not expressly recognized as members of the
Seminole Nation until the Treaty of 1866.46 Thus, this requirement has
effectively excluded them from participating in programs that assist with,
among other things, school clothing, burial expenses, elder care, and edu-
cational expenses.4 7 The Freedmen argued throughout the litigation that
the United States government allowed the Nation to discriminate against
them.4" However, neither the district court nor the appellate court ever
reached the merits of the Freedmen's claims. Because of its tribal sover-
eignty, the Seminole Nation itself could not be joined in the litigation, 9
and the Tenth Circuit found that the Seminole Nation had interests in the
litigation that would be prejudiced if the litigation moved forward with-
out it."0 Therefore, the Freedmen were left without a remedy and without
a court to hear their claims.
Although the Freedmen clearly have been a part of the Seminole
Nation from its inception, the Tenth Circuit's holding in Davis prevents
40. Davis v. United States, 343 F3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2003).
41. Id. at 1285.
42. Id. at 1287.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1288 (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1285.
49. Id. at 1289.
50. Id. at 1292.
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them from participating fully as members. The Freedmen helped to build
the Nation and were essential in allowing it to thrive."1 Yet by invoking
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, the Nation has been able to deny the
Freedmen, who make up at least one-third of the Nation's membership, 2
their bona fide rights as members.
C. Freedmen Within the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw,
and Chickasaw Nations
1. Cherokee Freedmen
Indian-Black relations within the Cherokee Nation have never been
as favorable to Blacks as Indian-Black relations within the Seminole Na-
tion. Despite the treaty of 1866, which purportedly granted Freedmen all
the same rights as other native Cherokees, the Freedmen were never fully
accepted as citizens of the Cherokee Nation. 3 Cherokee Freedmen can-
not vote on tribal matters or participate in tribal activities unless they
demonstrate a certain percentage of Cherokee blood. Unlike in the Semi-
nole Nation, Cherokee Freedmen have rarely held leadership positions
within the Cherokee Nation 4 and the status of Freedmen has continued
to decline over time within the Nation.5
One explanation for the differential treatment of Cherokee Freed-
men is the Cherokee Nation's adoption of slavery in its most vicious
form. The Cherokees held more slaves than any other Indian Nation, and
slavery within the Cherokee Nation closely resembled slavery in the Deep
South.5 6 The Nation's unfettered adoption of slavery undoubtedly con-
tributed to what one commentator referred to as a "long-held Cherokee
bias against dark skin."57 The dark skin bias cultivated a social distance be-
tween Cherokees and former slaves s that continues to manifest itself
today through the Cherokee Nation's attempts to keep Freedmen from
fully participating in the Nation.
The Cherokee Freedmen argue that the Cherokee Nation is violat-
ing an 1866 treaty with the United States 9 that gave Cherokee Freedmen
51. See 60 Minutes II (CBS television broadcast,July 10, 2002).
52. Seminole Nation v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 455, 472 (1933).
53. Sturm, supra note 12, at 226.
54. MAY, supra note 5, at 72.
55. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 381.
56. Sturm, supra note 12, at 225 (quoting DANIEL F LITTLEFIELD JR., ThE CHEROKEE
FREEDMEN: FROM EMANCIPATION TO AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 8,9 (1978)).
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"all the rights of native Cherokees" 6° Pursuant to this treaty, Cherokee
Freedmen were able to hold political office, vote, and participate fully
within the Cherokee Nation.6 The Nation, however, distinguishes its case
from Davis v. United States." A spokesperson from the Cherokee Nation
claimed that although the Seminole Nation changed its constitution to
evict its Black members, Freedmen able to document Cherokee ancestry
have always been eligible for membership within the Cherokee Nation.63
However, a history of racism has been entrenched within the Cherokee
Nation since its beginnings.
The Cherokee Freedmen are now embroiled in a legal battle very
similar to the one begun by the Seminole Freedmen.64 They are also suing
the BIA and are represented by the same attorneys who represented the
Seminole Freedmen.65 In addition, the Cherokee Freedmen recently es-
tablished a Legal Defense Fund to support their case. 66 Unless Congress or
the appropriate executive agencies intervene, or the courts take a position
different from that of the Tenth Circuit, the Cherokee Freedmen will fare
no better than the Seminole Freedmen.
6 7
2. Creek Freedmen
At least one scholar places the Creeks in the middle of the race-
relation spectrum of the Five Civilized Tribes, alongside the Cherokee
Nation, stating that "the Creeks and Cherokees impeded the political and
social equality of their African American citizens. '68 While many full-
blooded Creeks apparently treated Black slaves like free people and only
required them to pay a "tribute,' 6 9 life for Blacks living among the Creeks
60. Celia E. Naylor-Ojurongbe, "Born and Raised among These People, I Don't Want to
Know Any Other": Slaves'Acculturation in Nineteenth-Century Indian Territory, in CoNiouNCD-
ING THE COLOR LsNE, supra note 1, at 176.
61. Cherokee Freedmen Protest Cherokee Election, The African-Native American History
& Genealogy Web Page, at http://www.affican-natveamerican.com/election.htm (July 31,
2003) [hereinafter Cherokee Freedmen Protest].
62. Cherokee Freedmen Caught in High-Level Dispute, Indianz.com, at http://




65. Seminole Freedmen Lose Another Court Appeal, Indianz.com, at http://
www.indianz.com/News/archives/001391.asp (Sept. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Seminole Freed-
men Lose].
66. Legal Defense Fund for Cherokee Freedmen Established,The African-Native Ameri-
can History & Genealogy Web Page, at http://www.afiican-nativeamerican.com/
fund.htm (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter Legal Defense Fund].
67. See supra Part I.B for discussion of Davis outcome.
68. MAY, supra note 5, at 4.
69. Id. at 45.
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was more difficult than that of Blacks living among the Seminoles. The
Creeks passed "slave codes" that restricted the activities of Blacks, forbade
slaves from owning property, and prevented the offspring of Indian and
Black unions from inheriting.7
There is evidence, however, that the Creeks did accept and embrace
Blacks to a certain extent.71 For example, Blacks at times held office
within the Creek Nation. 2 In addition, other tribes sometimes regarded
the Creeks as less civilized because of their relative lack of prejudice to-
ward Blacks.73 Thus, while the Creeks did not welcome Blacks as equal
citizens, they did not reject them to the extent that other tribes did.
3. Choctaw and Chickasaw Freedmen
Blacks traditionally have been least respected within the Choctaw
and Chickasaw Nations. Both Nations were "great sticklers for racial pu-
rity,"4 and both had "a 'decided aversion' to intermixture with [Blacks]." 5
One southern White even praised the Chickasaw Nation for its insistence
on racial integrity and its refusal to adopt the Freedmen into the tribe.
7 6
During the Civil War, the vast majority of the Choctaw and Chicka-
saw supported the Confederacy.77 These tribes generally felt that Blacks
were to blame for the South's inability to succeed in the War." Although
all of the Indian tribes were opposed to the idea of Black colonization
after the war, the Choctaw and Chickasaw most resisted the idea.79 Both
tribes were eventually forced to give their Freedmen land, limited rights,
and the electoral franchise."
The Choctaw lynched and terrorized their Black Freedmen to drive
them off of tribal land.' Those Choctaw Freedmen who chose to stay
with the tribe were treated similarly to non-Indian Blacks. The tribe re-
stricted them to patronizing "Black-only" businesses and attending
70. Id.
71. Id. at 255--64.
72. Id. at 256.
73. PORTER, THE NEGRO, supra note 27, at 44.
74. Id. at 43.
75. Id. at 73.
76. Id. at 78.
77. Id. at 73. In comparison, the Seminoles and Creeks were generally opposed to
the Confederacy and the Cherokees were evenly divided,
78. Id. at 74.
79. Id. at 76.
80. Id.
81. KIM DRAMER, NATIVE AMERICANS AND BLACK AMERICANS 53 (1997).
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segregated schools and churches. 2 They never attained full and equal
tribal rights. 3
D. The Legacy of Slavery in the United States
As one commentator noted, "this country was founded on the backs
of Black slaves and Indian lands."8 While Indians practiced their own
brand of slavery for centuries before White settlers arrived in America, the
racist nature of the slavery practiced by Whites made it different from
anything in which the Indians had formerly engaged.85 The introduction
of slavery both in White and Indian settings in its most virulent form still
has legal, cultural, and social ramifications for Blacks today," including the
Freedmen's fights for equal rights within Indian nations. The effects of
slavery are so evident in the Freedmen battles that one scholar has argued
that "there have been no systematic efforts to remove the vestiges of slav-
ery from the law."7
1. Remnants of Slavery
Some individuals have maintained that Freedmen do not have, and
have never had, sovereignty or land base as an argument for tribal mem-
bership."8 This assertion is premised on ideas of personhood that are
traceable back to the days of slavery.8 9 Before 1866, when Indian nations
signed treaties granting their Black members citizenship status, Blacks
were generally thought of as property, and the assumption was that all
people of African descent had been slaves before 1866.90
Therefore, when the Seminole Nation establishes programs open only
to those members who descended from members of the Seminole Nation
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Phillips, supra note 1, at 375. See generally William Bradford, With a Very Great
Blame on Our Hearts: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Plea for Peace with Justice, 27
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 21 (2002/2003) (discussing the short-lived Indian slave trade and
arguing that, during its existence, Indian slavery was as horrific as Black slavery).
85. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 371.
86. See RANDALL ROBINSON, ThE DEBT: WHAT AMEpICA OwEs TO BLACKS 76 (2000)
("The discriminatory attitudes spawned to justify slavery ultimately guaranteed that, even
after emancipation, [B]lacks would be concentrated at the bottom of American society
indefinitely").
87. Saito, supra note 22, at 1172.
88. David Melmer, Dialogue Opens on Black Indians in Indian Country: Going to the
Heart of Most Discussion is Tribal Sovereignty, INDIAN CouNTRY TODAY (LAKOTA TIMES), Nov.
29, 2000, at A8.
89. Saito, supra note 22, at 1172-74.
90. Id. at 1172-73.
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"as it existed in ... 1823:"' it is "tracing current rights back to people's
status at a time when they were considered 'property' under the law."
92
These eligibility requirements cultivate the idea that Blacks are not entitled
to any tribal benefits that stem from their place in history before 1866
when they were formally recognized as citizens of Indian nations. As one
scholar stated: "[Tihe United States government ... defines [Seminole
Freedmen], in the eyes of the law, as unworthy of rights today because
they were legally considered [W]hite people's property yesterday."
93
Slavery was also a driving force behind the manipulation of relations
between Indians and Blacks by southern Whites during the colonial pe-
riod.94 Because they were fearful of both slave uprisings and Indian
retaliations against them, "[W] hites attempted to keep [slaves and Indians]
separate and sowed distrust among them in order to prevent concerted
actions against [W]hites."9 This is one of the earliest examples of racial
animosity being deliberately created between Indian and Black groups,
and the remnants of that dissention are still obvious today in the interplay
between Indian nations and their Freedmen members.
White slaveholders also contributed to the strife between Indians
and Blacks by offering awards to Indians for the capture of runaway
slaves. 6 In some instances, slaves were also armed to fight Indians." Be-
cause they were so invested in keeping slave and Indian groups apart, it
was particularly disturbing for United States officials to learn that some
Indian tribes were harboring escaped slaves.99 White slaveholders were
especially angered by the freedoms enjoyed by Blacks within the Semi-
nole Nation because they felt such independence undermined the system
of slavery upon which they so heavily relied.99 Slaves did not flee to any
one Indian nation, however-throughout Indian communities in the
South,"Whites . .. found [B]lack faces staring back at them.""'
Although some Indian groups embraced Blacks to a certain extent
and even provided shelter to runaway slaves, the seeds of discrimination
91. Davis v. United States, 343 F3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted).
92. Saito, supra note 22, at 1174.
93. Id.; see also Henry, supra note 7 ("The United States ... is utilizing the legal
concept of slavery that [3]lacks could not own land rights in 1823 to distribute the money
in a discriminatory factor by not including the [Seminole Freedmen] ").
94. See MAY, supra note 5, at 19-20.
95. Id. at 19.
96. Id. at 20 (discussing the various "divide and rule" tactics used by Whites in at-
tempts to create fear and suspicion between Indians and slaves).
97. WILLIAM LOREN KATZ, THE BLACK WEST: A DOCUMENTARY AND PICTORIAL His-
TORY oF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN ROLE IN THE WESTwARD EXPANSION OF THE UNITED
STATES 5 (1996),
98. Peter B. Gallagher, History of the Seminoles, SEMINOLE TRB., Aug. 22, 1997, at S17.
99. See DRAMER, supra note 81, at 30.
100. KArz, BLACK INDIANS, supra note 14, at 126.
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had already been sown. Because of the lengths Whites went to in creating
hostility between Indians and Blacks, it comes as no surprise that "the
objects of prejudice (Native Americans and African Americans in the per-
ception of [W]hites) became themselves prejudiced against each other."''
Eventually, Indian nations that more actively shunned Blacks became
known as the "higher class."'102 The perception of an Indian civilization
went hand-in-hand with that particular nation's treatment of Blacks, and
at one point a federal Indian agent remarked that "the fastest way to civi-
lize the Indians would be to give each Indian family a couple of [B]lack
slaves " ' 3 Whites accepted Blacks living within Indian tribes so long as
they were being used as slaves and thereby helping to civilize the Indians
within those tribes. Thus, Blacks were "welcomed as slaves and discarded
as free people."'" 4
2.The One-Drop Rule
The one-drop rule, or the rule of"hypodescent""'15 defines any per-
son with even "one drop" of Black blood as Black.'0 6 The one-drop rule
allowed slaveholders to claim ownership of any person with Black ances-
try regardless of any White ancestry 0 7 In effect, White slaveholders
developed the one-drop rule to further the expansion of their slave popu-
lations." s
The one-drop rule had implications for Whites in their dealings
with Indians as well."' While Blacks did not originally have land owner-
ship claims, Native Americans did."0 Thus, Whites would benefit from a
reduction in Indian populations."' By using the one-drop rule, Whites
101. MAY, supra note 5, at 7.
102. Wilton Marion Krogman, The Racial Composition of the Seminole Indians of Florida
and Oklahoma, 19 J. NEGRO HIST. 412, 424 (1934) (noting that the Cherokee, Chickasaw,
and Choctaw tribes were once regarded as the "higher class" among the Five Civilized
Tribes and did not "mix with the Negroes").
103. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 375.
104. Cherokee Nation Hears Freedman Case, The African-Native American History &
Genealogy Web Page, at http://www.african-nativeamerican.com/freedcase.htm (June
1998) [hereinafter Cherokee Nation Hears].
105. Eva Marie Garroutte, The Racial Formation of American Indians: Negotiating Legiti-
mate Identities Within Tribal and Federal Law, 25 AM. INDiAN Q. 224, 230 (2001).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See Miles, supra note 7, at 147 ("[The one-drop rule] ensured an ever-growing
slave population fattened by the children of Black slaves and White masters, even as it
protected White people from legitimizing 'mulattos,' 'quadroons,' and 'octoroons' as
White.").
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could categorize mixed Black-Indian persons as Black and therefore have
fewer "real" Indians with whom to negotiate land deals and treaties.
1 12
While the one-drop rule has been used as an inclusory device to
define Blacks, Native Americans use a much more exclusionary standard in
defining tribal membership. ' As one Freedman put it, "[t]his is America,
where being to any degree Black is the same thing as being to any degree
pregnant.""' However, in order to be recognized by the federal
government as Indian, applicants must go through tedious and sometimes
futile procedures to prove the existence of the appropriate degree of
Indian blood."'
The one-drop rule helps explain the differential treatment Indians
with Black blood experience in relation to those Indians who claim to be
mixed with White blood. The majority of Indian nations were made up of
"full bloods" but they had little power. Because of their White ancestry,
"mixed bloods" were somehow superior, and in contrast, those with Black
blood were inferior.' 6 During the days of slaveholding, it was the Indians
with White ancestry that usually owned slaves and held power on Indian
lands and reservations."' Even today, there exists a group of persons
known as "Intermarried Whites" within the Cherokee Nation that do not
have any Indian blood but are considered tribal citizens."' Thus, to a cer-
tain extent, Whiteness has been revered in Indian nations just as it has
been in dominant society.
112. Id.
113. Garroutte, supra note 105, at 231 (explaining that only the "slightest trace" of
"Black blood" is required for an individual to be placed in the category of African Ameri-
can while American Indians must show proof of substantial amounts of "Indian blood" in
order to be considered Native American); see also Welburn, supra note 6, at 293 ("I won-
dered how an Indian who was three-quarters or more White could be Indian while
Indians who were a quarter Negro had to be Negro.").
114. Sturm, supra note 12, at 241 (quoting a Cherokee Freedmen descendent).
115. Cherokee Freedmen Protest, supra note 61 (explaining the routines that Cherokee
Freedmen are often put through in order to enroll themselves and their children, including
being sent to obtain Certificate of Indian Blood cards that they are ultimately unable to
obtain because they are unable to show that they have the requisite blood quantum).
116. KA-z, BLACK INDiANs, supra note 14, at 137-38.
117. Id.
118. Cherokee Nation Hears, supra note 104 (noting also that the Delaware Indians
have been adopted into the Cherokee Nation and have been granted citizenship, while the
Freedmen who were also adopted into the Nation have not been granted citizenship).
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E. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Tribal sovereign immunity1 9 protects the right Indian tribes have to
"exercise supreme and independent power in their decision making."'120
This immunity is a bedrock principle of Indian Law that has become cru-
cial to Indian nations as a means of protecting their ways of life. 2'
Accordingly, "sovereignty, the inherent right of self-government and self-
determination, is the focal point in all Indian issues." '
Like the federal government, tribal governments have the authority
to structure their governments and court systems as they wish.12 3 Tribal
immunity is a product of settled case law' and "not subject to diminu-
tion by the States.' 2 The same rationales that are used to defend state and
federal immunity from suit are used to explain and defend tribal immu-
nity. 126 While there are limits on tribal jurisdiction, 27 tribal governmental
authority is expansive and includes the powers to define tribal member-
ship or citizenship;121 create and apply criminal and civil codes; 29 and
allocate, regulate, and protect tribal lands. 3 Therefore, due to the impor-
tant governmental functions that they perform, tribal governments are
allowed the same immunity from suit as the federal government.
119. See Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The Evolution of Tribal Immunity,
24 Am. INiDA L. Rav. 99 (1999/2000) (analyzing tribal sovereign immunity and its ori-
gins).
120. Patricia R. Wickman, A Government of Seminoles: The Talk Carriers, SEMINOLE
TRIB., Aug. 22, 1997, at S1.
121. See Sidney L. Harring, Crazy Snake and the Creek Struggle for Sovereignty: The
NativeAmerican Legal Culture andnAmerican Law, 34 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 365,365 (1990).
122. Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Ques-
tion at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MicH.J.L. REFO M 275,300 (2000/2001).
123. SHARON O'BR1EN,AMEARcAN INDiANTRBAL GOVERNMENTS 197 (1989).
124. Id. at 101.
125. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg.Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,756 (1998).
126. One author cites the following four reasons why the arguments in support of
state and federal immunity also support immunity for Indian tribes:
First, tribes did not participate in the creation of the constitutional system of
government and therefore their interests are in a much more precarious posi-
tion than those of the states.... Second, while states have generally prospered
since their inclusion in the Union, such is not the case for Indian tribes ...
Third, tribes often lack the legal resources states have at their disposal when
they need to defend themselves from lawsuits. Finally, even the Supreme
Court has stated that federal judicial interference in tribal actions can do lit-
tle more than "unsettle a tribal government's ability to maintain authority."
Wilson, supra note 119, at 102-03.
127. Id. at 198,292.
128. Id. at 200.
129. Id. at 205.
130. Id. at 215.
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Although they enjoy certain powers as sovereign entities, Indian na-
tions may also be characterized as "domestic dependent nations."'3 ' Tribes
are "domestic" because they are located within the physical boundaries of
the United Sates and "dependent" because their authority is restricted."'
They are allowed to yield a somewhat limited form of governmental
power and independence.133
Currently, "an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress
has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.'' 34 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has stated that "[a] tribe's right to define its own
membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its
existence as an independent political community.'t 3 s The Court has also
indicated that because of the uniqueness of tribal cultures, whose dictates
are largely unfamiliar to federal courts, the judiciary should be hesitant to
intrude upon the domain of Indian governments.'36
The limitations on tribal governments are important considerations
in the Freedmen controversy because the tribes are using their power as
government entities and the benefit of sovereign immunity that comes
with such status in denying Freedmen rights as tribal citizens.'37 Due to
the nearly unfettered control that Indian tribes have in determining tribal
membership and involvement, the Supreme Court has held that Indian
tribes are necessary parties in litigation, such as that brought by the Semi-
nole Freedmen, that directly challenges the tribe's ability to decide who
may participate in its programs.13 Therefore, any case brought by a
Freedmen group must join the particular tribe in question as a party.'39
However, the Supreme Court disfavors judicial intervention when an In-
dian nation asserts its tribal sovereignty to avoid litigation.'" Courts place
great emphasis on the ability of tribal governments to remain "culturally
and politically distinct entit[ies] *"'"I Tribal sovereign immunity is an im-
portant consideration in the Freedman controversy, where tribal sovereign
immunity blocks Freedman from the ability to contest the denial of flill
tribal membership.
131. Christina D. Ferguson, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day Lesson on
Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REv. 275,281 (1993).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg.Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,754 (1998).
135. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,72 n.32 (1978).
136. Id.
137. See infra Part II.A (exploring the tribal use of sovereign immunity to discrimi-
nate against Black Freedmen); see also Cherokee Freedmen Caught, supra note 62 (quoting
Jon Velie, an attorney for the Seminole and Cherokee Freedmen, who points out that
some Indian nations are using sovereignty as a mechanism for denying Black Freedmen
their rights).
138. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
140. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72.
141. See id.
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II. ANALYsis
A. Interpreting the Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine in the Courts
1.The Development ofTribal Immunity and
the Assessment of Fault
Although the doctrine of tribal immunity is a product of case law,
"its development was purely accidental and purely a creation of the judi-
ciary."' 142 In Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,143 the Court noted
that although the doctrine purportedly comes from the Court's opinion
in Turner v. United States,'4 that case does not actually support the doc-
trine."' The Turner Court made "an assumption of immunity for the sake
of argument, not a reasoned statement of doctrine."' 46 The Court then
noted that the legislation passed by Congress authorizing the suit in
TurnerJ47 was premised not on the Tribe's sovereign status, as is widely be-
lieved, but because without it, the Tribe could not have been sued in any
court without its consent.4 Hence, Turner "is but a slender reed for sup-
porting the principle of tribal sovereign immunity."'49
Kiowa is important because it leaves no doubt that the Court gener-
ally dislikes the doctrine of tribal immunity' but retains it because
Congress has not taken any steps toward abolishing it.' Kiowa explicitly
recognizes that "tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safe-
guard self-governance." '2 It also makes clear the Court's belief that
Congress has the duty of determining the appropriate boundaries of tribal
immunity because it has the sole power to alter the limits of tribal immu-
nity through explicit legislation.'
142. Wilson, supra note 119, at 125.
143. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
144. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
145. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756.
146. Id. at 757.
147. Congress passed a law allowing Turner, a non-Indian, to sue the Creek Nation
in the Court of Claims for the destruction of his property. Id. at 756.
148. Id. at 757.
149. Id.
150. See Wilson, supra note 119, at 124,126.
151. See id. at 125 ("[T]he Supreme Court retained the doctrine because Congress
often chose not to abrogate tribal immunity in order to promote tribal economic devel-
opment and self-sufficiency."); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72
(1978).
152. 523 U.S. at 758.
153. See id. at 759.
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In 2002, Seminole Nation v. Norton"4 indicated a tentative willingness
by the judiciary to intervene on behalf of the Seminole Freedmen. In
Norton, the Seminole Nation sought a declaration that the Department of
the Interior violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the
"Principal Chief" Act when it refused to recognize the Nation's General
Council or its newly elected Chief.-" The Department of Interior's
("DOI") refusal came after the Nation submitted amendments to the
Seminole Constitution that would have excluded the Freedmen from
membership in the Nation and held an election in which the votes of
Freedmen tribal members were not counted.
15 6
The court held that the DOI had not acted contrary to law in
refusing to recognize the newly elected Chief or those General Council
members who ran for office in violation of the original Seminole
Constitution.15 In so holding, the court stated that "the Nation [had]
blatantly disregarded the requirements of its own Constitution and sought
to exclude longtime members of its own tribe from seeking office and
participating on the General Council."'58
In response to the argument that the case was about the Nation's
sovereignty and its "unequivocal" desire to remove the acting Chief, the
court held that the Secretary of the Interior had the duty to protect indi-
vidual members of the tribe whether the infringement was by members
or nonmembers of the tribe."5 9 Furthermore, the exclusion of the Freed-
men from participation in the election was sufficient justification for the
refusal of the DOI to recognize the newly elected members. 6
At first glance, this case suggests that courts may intervene in actions
such as those currently brought by Freedmen groups. However, Norton
treads a fine line between upholding the DOI's decision and protecting
the sovereign rights of the Seminole Nation.'6' Moreover, the court de-
cided the case pursuant to the authority provided to it under the APA,
which allows it to set aside agency actions, findings, or conclusions that
are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with the law."'62 The court made clear that it could not issue any
154. 223 F Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2002).
155. Id. at 125.
156. Id. at 125-26.
157. Id. at 147-48.
158. Id. at 144.
159. Id. at 146.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 147.
162. Id.; see also Harrison v. Dep't of Interior, No. 99-7108, 2000 WL 1217841, at *2
(10th Cir. Aug. 28, 2000) (declining to set aside the BIA's action under an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard in a case arising out of a dispute between the Choctaw Nation and a
plaintiff who was seeking membership in the Nation).
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order purporting to impose a certain form of government on the Semi-
nole Nation. 63
The Norton court essentially claimed that its hands were tied in mat-
ters dealing exclusively with the sovereign immunity of tribal
governments. The court was able to intervene only because the case in-
volved government agency actions and implicated federal statutes. The
case suggests, however, that Congress, as well as government agencies such
as the DOI and BIA, should be involved in assessing the proper bounda-
ries of tribal immunity.
While Congress has plenary power over tribes,"' the DOI and BIA
play a large role in fashioning and interpreting Indian Law.1"' Since courts
review DOI actions according to an "arbitrary and capricious" standard,
16
rulings made by the Department are accorded great deference and are
important in deciding the fate of Indian nations and individuals within
those nations.
Although the Court mentioned the "accidental" beginnings of tribal
sovereign immunity,'67 courts have continued to adhere to its strictures.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the power of tribal governments to set
their own membership criteria,'68 and courts generally have recognized
that one of an Indian tribe's most elemental powers is its authority to es-
tablish its own membership criteria.'69 Thus, Freedmen groups may find it
quite difficult to attain relief by looking solely to the judicial branch of
government.
2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
An important example of judicial acceptance, however reluctant, of
tribal immunity is found in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez."' Martinez is
directly applicable to the immunity issue because it also deals with a form
of discrimination-gender discrimination.
163. Norton, 223 F Supp. 2d at 147.
164. Wilson, supra note 119, at 127; see F COHEN, HANDBOOK or FEDERAL INIDIAN
LAW 219 (1982 ed.) (noting that the term "plenary" does not mean "absolute" or "total"
but is used to describe the congressional power over Indians).
165. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the
United States Secretary of the Interior must call, hold, and approve of elections to adopt,
revoke, or amend tribal constitutions); see also Johnston, supra note 12, at 265 (stating that
the Seminole Nation's constitution requires the BIA to approve any changes to its
membership criteria).
166. Norton, 223 F Supp. 2d at 147.
167. See supra text accompanying note 142.
168. Brownell, supra note 122, at 307.
169. COHEN, supra note 164, at 20.
170. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). See generally Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 307, 310-15 (1991-1992) (discussing
Martinez and its treatment by the lower courts and, ultimately, the Supreme Court).
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Julia Martinez, a fill-blooded member of the Santa Clara Pueblo,
brought suit under Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act'' against the
Santa Clara Pueblo and its governor.7  The suit resulted from a
membership ordinance passed by the tribe two years before Martinez
married a man who was not a Santa Clara Pueblo member.' 7 The
ordinance held that children born of marriages between female members
of the Santa Clara Pueblo and male non-members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo were not members of the tribe, while children born of marriages
between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and female non-
members were members.7 4 As a result of this ordinance, even children
raised on the reservation were excluded from participation and lost all
property rights once their mother died.
17
The Court never reached the merits of the case, 71 instead holding
that Title I of the ICRA does not authorize a federal cause of action
against a tribe or its officers either expressly or by implication. 7 The
Court also said that "[i]n the absence ... of any unequivocal expression of
contrary legislative intent, ... suits against [a] tribe under the ICRA are
barred by [the tribe's] sovereign immunity from suit."' 
8
The Court noted that "[t]ribal courts have repeatedly been recog-
nized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and
non-Indians."'7 9 However, it is reasonable to assume that it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff such as Julia Martinez-
one who is challenging the well-protected right of a tribe to determine
its own membership-to attain relief in a tribal court. Presumably, tribal
courts would be invested in protecting the sovereignty of tribal nations to
the detriment of a plaintiff like Martinez.
Davis v. United States8' illustrates this point. The district court found
that the Seminole Freedmen would not have an appropriate remedy if
their case were dismissed. 8' While noting the existence of tribal courts,
the Davis court expressed that it "[would] be futile for the [Freedmen] to
171. 25 U.S.C. % 1301-03 (2001).
172. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51.
173. Id. at 52.
174. Id. at 52 n.2.
175. Id. at 52-53.
176. Ferguson, supra note 131, at 275-76.
177. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51-52; see also Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 E2d 1457,
1461-62 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the only federal remedy provided by the ICRA is
habeas corpus relief).
178. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59.
179. Id. at 65.
180. 343 F3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2003).
181. Id. at 1290.
[VOIL. 10:233
The Plight of "Nappy-Headed" Indians
seek adjudication in [those] tribal forums."' 82 The Tenth Circuit did not
need to disturb that finding because the Defendants did not challenge
it,1SS indicating that even government agencies understand the futility of
bringing a claim in a tribal court when that claim directly disputes the
sovereignty of a tribe. Courts have explicitly recognized that persons
claiming discrimination at the hands of Indian tribes may not have a fo-
rum in which to express their grievances, yet they continue to uphold the
broad reading of tribal sovereignty and thereby leave the affected persons
without a remedy.'1'
B. Regulation by Congress and Executive Agencies
1. The Definition of "Indian" and Blood Quantum Requirements
Many of the problems associated with determining who will be rec-
ognized as an Indian for governmental purposes stem from the various
definitions of the word "Indian" found within federal legislation.8 The
result of these myriad and often conflicting definitions is that some indi-
viduals may be deemed Indian for one purpose but not for another.'86
Generally, legislation concerning Indians uses definitions based either on
blood quantum or tribal status, or in some cases, it does not use any defi-
nition at all."'
The federal government and many tribal governments currently
characterize their relationship to Indians in terms of race through blood
quantum requirements.8 " Such requirements demand that individuals be
able to prove a minimum degree of Indian ancestry to be eligible for cer-
tain programs or to be granted membership in certain tribes. 9 The
182. Id. at 1293.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 (finding that Congress' extraordinarily broad
authority over tribal matters constrains judicial authority).
185. See Garroutte, supra note 105, at 227 (noting that a 1978 congressional survey
found at least thirty-three separate definitions of the word "Indian" in different pieces of
federal legislation).
186. Brownell, supra note 122, at 277 (comparing the use of different definitions of
the word "Indian" in determining whether individuals are eligible to participate in various
government programs).
187. Id. at 278.
188. Id. at 277; Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States
Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NoTR Dtm L. Ray. 1461, 1482-83 (1991); see also Brown,
supra note 21, at 116-18 (discussing the ramifications of using racial composition as a de-
terminative factor in deciding who is Indian).
189. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 188, at 1489-90; Brownell, supra note 122, at 280-
81; Garroutte, supra note 105, at 224.
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requirement of at least one-quarter blood degree is used most fre-
quently190
The Seminole Nation recently has used both blood quantum and
tribal status to deny Freedmen membership in the tribe. Davis exemplifies
how the Nation has used tribal status to prevent the Freedmen from par-
ticipating in the Judgment Fund Award by only allowing descendents of
those who were tribal members in 1823 to participate in the program. '91
In addition, Norton discusses how the Nation attempted to implement a
constitutional amendment that would have required members to show
that they have at least one-eighth Seminole Indian blood.'92
Blood quantum requirements work hand-in-hand with the one-
drop rule. 93 While "[t]he 'one-drop rule' ensured that there would be
more Black laborers for slavery's human machine ... blood quantum ra-
tio[s] ensured that there would be more available land for White
settlement and development."' 194 Due to intermarriage between tribes,
blood quantum requirements were difficult criteria for Indians to meet. 19
As fewer Indians were actually categorized as Indians, fewer could make
land ownership claims.'96 Both means of determining group identity, the
one-drop rule and blood quantum requirements, originated in the nine-
teenth century with White policy-makers who were looking for ways to
broaden their own land base while ensuring that there were as few hin-
drances as possible.'97 As a result, Indian and Black identities are defined by
methods that originated outside of both Indian and Black communities.'9"
One problem with the government's use of blood quantum re-
quirements is that "by requiring enrollment and the possession of a
certain degree of blood quantum ... the federal government is providing
services and benefits to only a portion of the citizenship."'99 Moreover,
some commentators have argued that the government uses blood quan-
tum requirements to reduce the costs of federal programs.
20 0
The BIA has been a leader in using blood quantum requirements to
determine eligibility for federal benefits.2 ' The BIA has also relied dispro-
190. Garroutte, supra note 105, at 224 (explaining that "one-quarter blood degree" is
the most frequent standard for minimum "blood quantum" required for legal citizenship).
191. See supra Part I.B.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56; see also Johnston, supra note 12, at
262.
193. Miles, supra note 7, at 146-47.





199. O'Brien, supra note 188, at 1490.
200. Murg, supra note 17, at 5.
201. See Brownell, supra note 122, at 288-92.
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portionately on physical characteristics to determine blood quanta.2 °2 For
example, during the 1930s, the BIA sent a Harvard anthropologist to
North Carolina to determine whether the Lumbee group was actually
Indian.2 3 The anthropologist's method of determination was to place a
pencil in each person's hair, noting "Indian" if the pencil slipped through
the hair and "Negroid" if it did not."4 Even recently, the BIA has contin-
ued to rely heavily on blood quantum requirements without formally
publishing its certification procedures, violating a requirement under the
Administrative Procedure Act.205 Thus, the government agency most re-
sponsible for implementing federal programs on behalf of Indians has,
throughout its history, irresponsibly handled certification methods crucial
to Indians who assert claims for federal benefits.
2 6
Furthermore, the use of blood quantum requirements is a conven-
ient way for tribes to reduce the number of persons to whom they must
distribute scarce resources. One scholar has noted that "[a] tribe's decision
to rely on blood quantum (and its decision regarding which blood quan-
tum to use) is frequently linked to the struggle for tribal survival [or] the
desire to maximize wealth or political advantage."207 But some individuals
are concerned that blood quantum requirements are often used simply to
keep Blacks from membership in tribes."' The Seminole Freedmen situa-
tion in Davis substantiates this argument. Obviously, not until the
Seminole Nation looked for a way of excluding Blacks from its member-
ship did blood quantum became a viable option for the tribe to regulate
membership and participation within the Nation.2°9
202. Id. at 288.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 290.
206. See id. at 288-92 (discussing various shortcomings of the BIA in its handling of
blood quantum requirements, including exceeding its administrative authority by impos-
ing different, and more restrictive, blood quantum requirements than the authorizing
statutes allow).
207. Id. at 309.
208. 60 Minutes II, supra note 51 ("This whole business of degree of Indian blood is
just a concoction. It's just an excuse now that's been dreamed up of late in order to ex-
clude the Blacks from membership in the tribe.") (quoting Joe Opala, a professor at James
Madison University).
209. See id.; see also J hnston, supra note 12, at 267 (arguing that while the Seminole
Nation may have been bringing itself into line with Indian politics generally when it in-
troduced a blood quantum requirement, the requirement had the "unusual" effect of
excluding a significant portion of the tribe).
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2.The Dawes Commission
In 1893, Congress passed the Dawes Commission Act,2" ' which cre-
ated the Dawes Commission and granted it the authority to procure
agreements for allotment and for the subsequent dissolution of the tribal
governments of the Five Civilized Tribes.' The Act was passed in prepa-
ration for Oklahoma statehood. 12 The Dawes Commission also created
what became known as Dawes Commission Rolls ("Dawes Rolls") to
certify Indians within the Five Tribes.3
In 1906, Congress authorized the Dawes Commission to create
membership rolls for the Seminole Nation2 4 The Commission placed indi-
viduals on two separate rolls-the "Freedmen Roll" and the "Seminole
Blood Roll. '*"'s Although the Seminole Nation attempted, unsuccessfully, to
change its constitution in 2 0 0 0 ,t6 membership in the Nation has always
been determined by whether or not the person seeking membership can
trace his or her lineage to either the Freedmen Roll or the Seminole
Blood Roll."7 Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of the tribe to expel
them, the Seminole Freedmen remain bona fide members of the Semi-
nole Nation.
The widely held assumption by those wishing to oust Freedmen
from tribal membership is that Seminole Freedmen have little or no In-
dian blood.2 8 Due to intermarriage, some Freedmen actually had
Seminole blood, yet the Dawes Rolls rarely recognized this ancestry21 In
some cases, Blacks were all treated the same and placed on the Freedmen
Rolls regardless of whether or not they had ever been slaves. This held
true whether they were part-Indian, and thus could prove some degree of
Indian blood, or whether they were without any Indian ancestry whatso-
ever.2  Moreover, "[blecause the Seminole Nation is matrilineal, if an
individual's mother was a Freedmen and [her] father was Indian by blood,
210. See generally O'BIEN, supra note 123, at 129 ("[In 1893] Congress created the
Dawes Commission to negotiate with tribes for the allotment of their lands and the even-
tual creation of the state of Oklahoma.").
211. Dawes Commission Began in Late 1800s, CHEROKEEADvoc., Aug. 31, 1994, at 4.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see MAY, supra note 5, at 77-78 (discussing the Dawes Allotment Act and the
various tribal rolls established by the Dawes Commission).
214. Davis v. United States, 192 E3d 951,954 (10th Cir. 1999).
215. Id.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 154-62.
217. Davis, 192 E3d at 955.
218. See Johnston, supra note 12, at 267.
219. Id.; see also Garroutte, supra note 105, at 232-34 (discussing a variety of reasons
why individuals may not have been correctly enrolled on the Dawes Rolls).
220. MAY, supra note 5, at 79.
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that individual was enrolled [on] the Freedmen Roll." 221 Yet, if the indi-
vidual's mother was Indian by blood and father was Black, she would be
enrolled on the Seminole Blood Roll.
22
Some commentators have characterized blood quantum require-
ments and tribal rolls as modern-day grandfather clauses . 23 Grandfather
clauses were used in the Deep South to disenfranchise Blacks during the
Jim Crow Era by only allowing them to vote if their grandfathers had
voted. 224 This requirement effectively prevented most Blacks from voting
because their grandfathers had been legally prevented from voting. Thus,
southern legislatures were able to use facially non-discriminatory proce-
dures to strip Blacks of their rights in extremely discriminatory ways.
Similarly, blood quantum requirements prevent Blacks from being
recognized by Indian nations because such requirements are frequently
based upon tribal rolls that may have misrepresented the status of individ-
ual Blacks or excluded them altogether.22 Just as racist practices prevented
Blacks from voting in the Jim Crow South, some Black Freedmen now
cannot receive federal benefits because of discriminatory practices utilized
years ago when tribal rolls were created.
3. Congressional Power and Agency Authority
As previously noted, Congress has very broad powers over Indian
tribes,22 and only Congress possesses the Constitutional power to restrain
Indian tribes.2 The authority for this power is usually derived from the
Indian Commerce Clause,"2 the Treaty Clause, 2 9 and the Supremacy
Clause 3 ' of the Constitution.31 Consequently, tribal sovereignty "exists
only at the sufferance of Congress, 232 and any potential adjustments to
the relations between tribal and federal governments are within the
221. Saito, supra note 22, at 1171.
222. Id.
223. Legal Defense Fund, supra note 66.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US. 49, 72 (1978) ("Congress'
authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts in adjusting
relations between and among tribes and their members correspondingly restrained."); see
supra text accompanying notes 134, 164.
227. Wilson, supra note 119, at 109.
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
229. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
230. Id. at art.VI, cl. 2.
231. COHEN, supra note 164, at 211.
232. Ferguson, supra note 131, at 279.
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unique domain of Congress.2 33 While Congress' plenary power over In-
dian tribes may have some limitations, the Supreme Court has never held
an act of Congress against an Indian tribe to be unconstitutional.134 Pre-
sumably courts will uphold any potential changes Congress makes in the
law of tribal sovereignty immunity.
The DOI and BIA also exert a tremendous amount of power over
Indian tribes. 35 The Seminole Nation's constitution requires that any
changes made to it be approved by the BIA, 3 1 and the DOI has asserted
"that it has 'broad and possibly nonreviewable authority to disapprove or
withhold approval of [any] tribal constitutional amendment regarding
membership criteria."237 As previously noted, the standard of review for
BIA actions requires only that its decisions be set aside if they are "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."'38 Thus, the BIA and DOI have the authority to block ac-
tions taken by tribal nations, and their decisions will rarely be overturned
by federal courts due to the high standard of proof involved.
While Indian tribes have been most active in excluding Black
Freedmen from Indian nations, the problem of discrimination also lies
within those agencies charged with administering federal policy. 239 In the
Seminole case, BIA and DOI officials recommended to the Seminole Na-
tion that the Black Freedmen be excluded from participating in the
Judgment Fund Award.2 4 However, the DOI maintains that it was simply
"advising" the tribe as it sought to make its own decisions under the au-
thority of its sovereignty.'
While the DOI and BIA were active in fighting the exclusion of
Seminole Freedmen from participation in tribal elections in Norton,242 the
agencies have breached their duty to do the same for the Cherokee
233. Timothy W Joranko, Tribal Se!f-Determination Unfettered: Toward a Rule of Absolute
Tribal Official Immunity from Damages in Federal Court, 26 ARMz. ST. LJ. 987, 1017 (1994).
234. Ferguson, supra note 131, at 279.
235. See generally O'BRmN, supra note 123, at 262-63 (discussing the responsibilities
of the BIA).
236. Johnston, supra note 12, at 265.
237. Brownell, supra note 122, at 307.
238. Harrison v. Department of Interior, No. 99-7108, 2000 WL 1217841, at *2
(10th Cir. Aug. 28, 2000); see supra text accompanying notes 162, 166.
239. Daniels, supra note 8 ("The BIA has consistently refused to honor the request of
any Black Seminole who has applied for benefits under [the Judgment Fund] award,
thereby systematically discriminating against Seminoles of African descent.").
240. Davis v. United States, 343 E3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003); Martha Melaku,
Seeking Acceptance: Are the Black Seminoles Native Americans? Sylvia Davis v. The United
States of America, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 539, 547 (2002/2003);William Glaberson, Who
is a Seminole, and Who Gets to Decide?, N.YTiMES,Jan. 29, 2001, at Al.
241. Glaberson, supra note 240.
242. Seminole Nation v. Norton, 223 E Supp. 2d 122 (2002).
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Freedmen.243 In 2003, the BIA recognized a Cherokee election that ex-
cluded 25,000 Cherokee Freedmen from participation.24 The election
was held in direct violation of a statute requiring the Cherokee Nation to
submit any changes in election procedure prior to the election.2 " Thus,
the BIA has been undeniably schizophrenic in its treatment of Black
Freedmen and has blatantly ignored precedent that it helped to set.
The problem with congressional and agency disregard for Freedmen
claims may be political.216 The government may not be as concerned with
the merits of the claims brought by the Freedmen as it is with the reper-
cussions of providing a remedy to them.24 7 The government may fear that
if it were to provide a remedy for, say, the Seminole Freedmen, then it
would be bombarded with claims of discrimination by Blacks within
other Indian nations."' However, this argument suggests that Congress
would be forced to find a remedy for the problem if enough political
pressure were brought to bear on the outcome.4 9 The argument also sug-
gests that African American communities must become more involved in
supporting the Freedmen cause if that pressure is ever to become a real-
ity."'0 If African Americans band together as cohesive political groups with
an agenda that recognizes the plight of Black Freedmen, they will be bet-
ter able to advocate for the needs of those who are being denied access to
their tribal resources.
4. The Indian Civil Rights Act
In 1968, Congress passed the ICRA,251' a more limited version of the
constitutional rights guaranteed by the federal government that applies to
members of Indian tribes.2"2 The ICRA's requirements are "[a]rguably ...
the most pervasive limitation that the federal law places on the actions of
tribal officials' 25 3 It is also the only federal statute that directly addresses
the civil rights of persons under tribal jurisdiction." Title I of the Act
holds that, in exercising the powers of self-government, an Indian tribe
243. Press Release, Velie & Vehe Attorneys at Law, Bureau of Indian Affairs Recog-









251. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2001).
252. COHEN, supra note 164, at 666.
253. Joranko, supra note 233, at 1006.
254. COHEN, supra note 164, at 670.
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may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property withoutdue proc-
ess of law.
25
The ICRA would seem to provide the Freedmen's strongest claim
against Indian governments. However, Martinez illustrates the weaknesses
of the Act, since Julia Martinez lost her Title I gender discrimination suit
against the Santa Clara Pueblo.2 6 The Martinez Court made it clear that
the ICRA is primarily enforceable in tribal courts.2 7 This holding severely
limits the civil rights claims of Freedmen, because Freedmen will likely
find it nearly impossible to obtain relief in tribal courts.28
Some might-,argue -that automatically assuming that tribal courts
would not treat individuals bringing equal protection claims under the
ICRA fairly or with the same amount of judicial respect that persons
bringing other types of claims might receive is inappropriate. 9 Evidence
suggests that tribal courts are greatly concerned with issues of due process
and have developed sophisticated systems of dispute resolution similar to
those found in traditional American courts.2" Yet tribes have their own
unique notions of due process, in keeping with their right of self-
determination,26 ' and are not bound by the dictates of the dominant soci-
ety.262 Also, because ICRA cases have been brought so infrequently in
tribal courts since Martinez,26 it is difficult to assess just how fair tribal
courts may be when confronted with ICRA claims.
255. Id. at 667.
256. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1978); see supra text accom-
panying notes 170-83 for a discussion of Martinez.
257. COHEN, supra note 164, at 668-69.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 179-83.
259. See Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 465, 513 (1998) ("The evidence suggests that efforts to strip
tribes of sovereign immunity or to greatly expand federal review of tribal courts are over-
broad remedies for an exaggerated problem unfairly based on anecdote and cultural
prejudice.").
260. See Christian M. Freitag, Note, Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court Disposi-
tion of Due Process, 72 IND. L.J. 831, 831 (1997).
261. See Jennifer S. Byram, Civil Rights on Reservations: The Indian Civil Rights Act and
Tribal Sovereignty, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 491, 499 (2000) (discussing the view that civil
rights guarantees should not be mandated for tribes because of tribal traditions that value
the collective good over the rights of individuals); Freitag, supra note 260, at 857 ("Indian
nations have formulated their own notions of due process and equal protection in compli-
ance with both aboriginal and modern tribal law.").
262. Freitag, supra note 260, at 864 ("Even when they apply principles of due process
in ways that mirror Anglo-American courts, the tribal courts remain almost vehemently
aware of their ability to differ at their own discretion to protect cultural traditions and
tribal sovereignty.").
263. Byram, supra note 261, at 494,501; Freitag, supra note 260, at 843.
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Moreover, the ICRA, in the rare times that it has been implicated, is
most often used in criminal proceedings. 6 4 Little, if any, research specifi-
cally tracks the results of civil cases brought before tribal courts dealing
with equal protection claims challenging the correctness of membership
requirements--such as those that would presumably be brought by
Freedmen groups. Thus, it is still fair to assume that Black Freedmen
would face prejudice in tribal courts, especially when considering the
history of discrimination within many Indian tribes.
Another example of the shortcomings of the ICRA is exposed by
the Supreme Court's refusal in Martinez to find a federal cause of action
to enforce the statute within federal courts.2 6 Although it did recognize
that causes of action are often implied when enforcing civil rights statutes,
the Court found the right of tribal self-determination to be a more com-
pelling policy. 66 Moreover, because the ICRA does not limit tribes'
immunity from suit, the ICRA cannot be directly enforced against Indian
tribes.2 67 In sum, the federal government has created a statute that, on its
face, appears to protect Julia Martinez, Black Freedmen, and persons simri-
larly situated. Yet by failing to create a mechanism that allows claims
brought under the ICRA to be heard in federal courts, the government
leaves individuals claiming discrimination at the hands of Indian tribes to
fend for themselves in tribal courts.
C. Breakdown of Indian-Black Relations
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the ordinance in question in
Martinez was "an arbitrary and expedient solution" to the "practical eco-
nomic considerations" that had arisen within the tribe." The same may
be said for the Black Freedmen within Indian nations. As one Seminole
Freedman explained, "[w]hen money and the government entered the
picture, everything changed."269 Indian tribes possess a strong interest in
thwarting claims made by Freedmen groups because scarce governmental
resources are allotted to them to share within the tribe.27
The controversy surrounding the Freedmen has contributed to the
growing animosity between "blood" Indians and Freedmen.27 ' Black
264. McCarthy, supra note 259, at 506.
265. COHEN, supra note 164, at 668.
266. Id.
267 Id.
268. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 E2d 1039, 1048 (1976).
269. 60 Minutes II, supra note 51.
270. Brownell, supra note 122, at 304, 309 ("A tribe's decision to rely on a blood
quantum (and its decision regarding which blood quantum to use) is frequently linked to
the struggle for tribal survival, the desire to maximize wealth or political advantage, or
other outside forces affecting the tribe.").
271. See generally supra text accompanying note 4.
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Seminoles are no longer welcome or accepted, within the Seminole Na-
tion,"27 and Cherokee Freedmen "continue to be one of the most
marginalized groups in Native North America."2 73 Furthermore, many
Freedmen identify themselves as both African American and Indian, caus-
ing some resentment among Indians who do not believe that a person
may be both.17' Because Freedmen challenge prevailing racial ideologies,
they may be forced to choose only one racial or ethnic identity.1
71
III. RESOLUTION
A. The Role of Executive Agencies
In Seminole Nation v. Norton, the Tenth Circuit held that, "[w]here
[an Indian tribe] will not protect the Constitutional rights of its minority
members, the BIA has the responsibility, and indeed, the duty, to intervene
and attempt to protect those rights through appropriate remedies." '276 The
government needs to fulfill this duty on behalf of the Cherokee Freed-
men. It should respond as it did for the Seminole Freedmen277 by refusing
to recognize the Cherokee election that excluded the Cherokee Freed-
men from participation. Based on Norton, courts would uphold such
action.
The BIA and DOI also must invalidate any proposed ordinances or
mandates similar to the Usage Plan proposed by the Seminole Nation.
7
1
That Plan effectively excluded the Seminole Freedmen from participating
in the Judgment Fund Programs funded by the Judgment Fund Award.7 9
However, invalidating tribal ordinances is difficult because agency review
is limited to facial invalidity and regulations such as blood quantum re-
quirements that do not appear at first glance to unfairly discriminate
against particular groups may often slip through the cracks. 210 Historically,
government agencies have been more responsive when the tribal ordi-
nance or legislation in question has involved more blatant
discrimination." ' For example, the DOI once invalidated a tribal ordi-
nance that excluded illegitimates-children born out of wedlock-from
272. Melaku, supra note 240, at 552.
273. Sturm, supra note 12, at 223.
274. Johnston, supra note 12, at 267.
275. Sturm, supra note 12, at 224.
276. 223 E Supp. 2d 122, 147 (D.D.C. 2002).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
278. Davis v. United States, 192 F3d 951, 955 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing the distri-
bution fund prepared by the Seminole Judgment Fund Committee that was approved by
the Seminole Nation General Council).
279. Id. at 956.
280. See COHEN, supra note 164, at 669 n.54.
281. See Davis, 192 E3d at 956.
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membership, "2 although ironically, this is a form of discrimination similar
to that practiced by Indian tribes in the current controversy.
However, government agencies can stop history from repeating itself
by refusing to allow tribal ordinances that mask discriminatory policies to
stand. In the case of the Seminole Freedmen, the Usage Plan formulated
by the Seminole Nation did not explicitly mention race, Freedmen, or
any other term that to a person unfamiliar with the history of the tribe
might signal discrimination toward Blacks,"' yet the Freedmen were still
excluded from the Judgment Fund Programs and denied tribal benefits
based upon their race.'
Ultimately, executive agencies may face difficulties in preventing In-
dian tribes from implementing discriminatory programs. Yet if the BIA
and DOI challenge such proposals, tribes will realize that executive agen-
cies fight discrimination instead of passively accepting it. Moreover,
Congress may eventually resolve the problem by either expanding or fur-
ther limiting agency review of tribal ordinances. Although Congress could
choose to stop agencies from reviewing tribal mandates at all, Congress
more likely would expand agency review and thereby give agencies
greater power to invalidate discriminatory legislation.
B. The Role of Congress
Congress holds the most federal power over Indian tribes and thus
bears responsibility for ensuring that tribal nations do not unfairly dis-
criminate against individuals. Congress could help to rectify the wrongs
experienced by Freedmen by either limiting tribal sovereign immunity or
strengthening the ICRA. However, neither option is easy, and scholars
and practitioners have widely debated both.
1. Limiting Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Limiting the boundaries of tribal sovereign immunity would be an
effective way for Congress to ensure a forum for Freedmen to bring their
claims. However, many problems inhere in such a proposal. 8 While gen-
der- and race-based discrimination are "bad:' tribal sovereignty, at least as
a theoretical concept, is "good."'2 6 Traditional Anglo-American law has
shaped a legacy ofWhite patriarchy that does not appreciate many of the
282. See COHEN, supra note 164, at 669 n.54.
283. See Davis, 192 F3d at 955-56.
284. See id.
285. See Laurence, supra note 170, at 315-16 (discussing the difficulty of coming to
terms with Martinez because of the tension between condeming sex discrimination and
protecting tribal self-determination).
286. Id. at 326.
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values fundamental to tribal ways of life.287 Tribal sovereignty protects na-
tive customs and lifestyles that are grounded in cultural perspectives that
differ radically from the views of dominant society."" As shown above,
because of the important interests that tribal sovereign immunity serves,
well-founded opposition to limiting the doctrine exists.
Scholars have argued extensively over the boundaries of tribal sover-
eign immunity. Some, like the Supreme Court, contend that tribal
sovereignty should be limited so that individuals suffering harm at the
hands of tribes may obtain relief,28 9 some would even completely abrogate
the doctrine.29 Others believe that tribal sovereignty should either stay as
it is or be further expanded because of a concern for the rights of Indian
tribes and their need for cultural and political autonomy.' Still others
prefer a middle-of-the-road approach that attempts to find a solution
amenable to all by balancing the equal protection concerns of individuals
with the need for tribal autonomy.292
One might imagine many different ways that Congress could re-
strict the boundaries of tribal immunity to protect the Freedmen. For
example, Congress could create legislation specifically prohibiting mem-
bership or program participation requirements that discriminate on the
basis of race or effectively exclude certain racial groups. However, Con-
gress has not indicated any desire to alter the boundaries of tribal
287. See id. at 324.
288. See id. at 325.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
290. See John W Borchert, Tribal Immunity Through the Lens of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Warrant for Codification, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 247, 251 (1999) ("The
Congress should end 'sovereign' immunity' before a Tribe does something so inherently
unfair or radical that there is no alternative.... The Tribes with their sovereign immunity
are no longer the victims of discrimination, they are the victimizers.") (quoting Tribal
Rights in Private Property Cases: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Indian Affairs, 103d
Cong. (1996) (statement of Lane E. Marcussen)); Byram, supra note 261, at 498 (discussing
the "American Indian Equal Justice Act" proposed by Senator Gorton that would have
forced tribes to waive their sovereign immunity and amended the ICRA so that federal
district courts would have jurisdiction over ICRA claims); Thomas R McLish, Note, Tribal
Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible Limits, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 173, 193 (1998) ("The
current breadth with which the doctrine of tribal immunity is applied is inconsistent with
the policies that underlie it, and inappropriately denies plaintiff; the ability to seek redress
in courts of law.").
291. See McCarthy, supra note 259, at 514 ("Any proposal which truly values exten-
sion of civil rights to tribal members must recognize the need for increased tribal court
advocacy"); Steve Russell, Seeking Justice: Critical Perspectives of Native People: A Black and
White Issue: The Invisibility ojAmerican Indians in Racial Policy Discourse, 4 GEo. PuB. PoL'Y
REv. 129, 130 (1999) ("The key to preserving Indian sovereignty is to make it unnecessary
to resort to federal or state courts.").
292. See Laurence, supra note 170, at 339 (arguing that although tribes should have
the power to make citizenship rules that reach all persons who come on reservations, those
persons should have a federal forum to complain about their treatment by tribes).
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immunity, and the logistical considerations of such a proposal render it a
truly monumental task.
2. Strengthening the Indian Civil Rights Act
Congress could also provide Freedmen groups a remedy by
strengthening the ICRA. As it stands, the ICRA serves no practical use to
Freedmen seeking relief against discriminatory tribal policies.293 If Con-
gress amended the ICRA to provide a federal cause of action, the
Freedmen would be able to take their issues to federal courts under Title
I, the equal protection clause of the ICRA.29
Some commentators have argued that the ICRA, like the doctrine
of tribal sovereign immunity generally, is overbroad and should be
amended so that individuals alleging that tribes have violated the ICRA's
guarantees have an impartial court to which they may appeal. 295 Others
have argued that an expansion of the ICRA is necessary to protect Indian
women from discriminatory tribal treatment so that they will have access
to unbiased non-tribal courts in which to bring their claims. 96 Certainly,
if expansion is necessary to protect women from gender discrimination, it
is also necessary to protect the Freedmen from racial discrimination, as the
same types of concerns about impartial and unbiased courts are impli-
cated.'97
Of course, some oppose any expansion of the ICRA. Much of this
opposition comes from Indian groups, many of whom were averse to the
implementation of the ICRA in the first place.28 While the statute was
being considered in Congress, some Indians stated that the ICRA was
merely unnecessary legislation while others worried that it would unduly
formalize tribal court systems and encroach upon tribal sovereignty."
Some Indian groups have argued that proposals purporting to allow fed-
eral judicial review of complaints under the ICRA further assault tribal
sovereignty.
3 °
293. See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
294. See COHEN, supra note 164, at 668.
295. See, e.g., Byram, supra note 261, at 504 (discussing how Congress should em-
power federal courts to enforce civil violations of ICRA when plaintiffs are not able to get
a fair adjudication of ICRA claims in tribal courts).
296. Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native American Women:
A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 179, 182 (1991) (proposing
an amendment to the ICRIA that would "provid[e] for specific gender protection while
respecting a limited tribal sovereignty").
297, See id. at 179,180.
298. See DAv H. GETCHES uT AL., FEDERAL IND AtN LAW 505 (4th ed. 1998).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 529.
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In 1991, the United State Commission on Civil Rights ("The
Commission") concluded five years of hearings and investigations into the
deprivations of Indian civil rights."0 ' The Commission documented abuses
of rights guaranteed to individuals under the ICRA30 2 and found that the
ICRA "required ... procedural protections of tribal governments without
providing the means and resources for their implementation. 30 3 Yet, even
after making those observations and claiming that the United States gov-
ernment had failed to provide adequate funding for the operation of
tribal judicial systems, the Commission declined to recommend legisla-
tion providing for review of ICRA claims by federal courts.3"4
Thus, the government has recognized a problem yet-beyond mak-
ing blanket assertions of fault-refuses to rectify the problem. The fact
that the Commission studied the on-going problem of abuses of Indian
civil rights for five years and still would not advocate any form of reme-
dial legislation suggests that the government is content to retain the
ICRA in its flawed form. In addition, Congress created the ICRA to es-
tablish what it felt were necessary civil rights protections, so it is unlikely
the ICRA will be repealed any time soon. Still, the creation of a federal
cause of action in the ICRA would allow Black Freedmen the opportu-




C. The Role of the Courts
Because massive hurdles confront any potential congressional at-
tempts to strengthen the ICRA or scale back tribal immunity, Freedmen
must also look to the courts for assistance. The judiciary has the power to
make a difference in the Freedmen struggle by taking a more active role
in solving the problem of discrimination within Indian tribes and may
actually be able to provide the most expedient solution to the problem of
tribal discrimination against Blacks.
1. Charge Congress and Find a Federal Cause of Action
The Supreme Court primarily holds Congress and, to a lesser ex-
tent, executive agencies responsible for solving the problems with tribal
sovereign immunity.30 The overly broad reach of tribal immunity frus-
trates the Court, which also has shown a tentative willingness to intervene
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. Laurence, supra note 170, at 344.
304. See GErCHEs, supra note 298, at 529-30.
305. Byram, supra note 261, at 502.
306. See supra Part II.A.I.
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in cases where a tribal nation has blatantly discriminated," 7 At the same
time, the Court has utilized a hands-off approach to the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity, thereby relieving itself of the responsibility of finding
a resolution to the problem of tribal discrimination.
3
01
In his dissent in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, Justice White ex-
pressed his disbelief that Congress meant to leave the enforcement of
Indian rights solely within the hands of tribal authorities, as tribal au-
thorities are often the ones charged with violating those rights. 39 Courts
should follow Justice White's lead and become more active in halting the
discriminatory practices of Indian tribes. One scholar noted that if the
Supreme Court wanted to, it could have found a federal cause of action in
Martinez.310 Yet instead of doing so, the Court hid behind the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty, thus proving that the equal protection of Indian citizens
does not concern it greatly."1
2. Distinguishing Martinez
The Freedmen could possibly distinguish their case from Martinez
using principles of constitutional law. Constitutional law treats sex-based
classifications differently from classifications based upon race.3 12 While
race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny 1 3 and are only per-
missible if "they are necessary to promote a compelling or overriding
interest of government," 4 sex-based classifications are subject to an in-
termediate standard of review that only "requires the government to




Therefore, the Freedmen could argue that the ICRA should apply
because the discrimination here is based on race, and race is constitution-
ally different. Directly attacking the ICRA using constitutional theories
may be difficult because of the state action problem and the necessity of
showing that the United States government caused the harm in order to
307. See supra text accompanying note 150-51.
308. See supra Part II.A.1.
309. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 82 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
("Given Congress' concern about the deprivations of Indian rights by tribal authorities, I
cannot believe, as does the majority, that it desired the enforcement of these rights to be
left up to the very tribal authorities alleged to have violated them.").
310. Ferguson, supra note 131, at 300.
311. Id. at 301.
312. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW § 14.5 (6th ed.
2000).
313. id.
314. Id. at § 14.8.
315. Id. at § 14.20.
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attain relief. 16 However, the Freedmen could argue that because race is a
suspect classification, any race-based discrimination claims should be ex-
amined under a heightened degree of scrutiny. Thus, a federal cause of
action could be found in such instances because the interest in preventing
racial discrimination outweighs the interest in shielding tribal sovereignty
from judicial encroachment.
CONCLUSION
The United States often prides itself on its efforts towards ending
discrimination, and the government has made numerous attempts to re-
dress the harms that minority groups have suffered at the hands of the
dominant majority. However, the United States has a long way to go if it
truly wants to be a nation in which all people are created equal.
Most people today would agree that American slavery was a horrific
system of bondage that mars the history of this country.Yet many do not
truly understand how the effects of slavery are still felt by persons of Afri-
can descent today. One of the many unfortunate consequences of this lack
of understanding is that the movement toward equal rights for Black
Freedmen has gone virtually unnoticed by persons not connected to Na-
tive American communities.
Certainly tribal sovereignty is important to the maintenance of
tribal independence and integrity. However, the guarantees of equal pro-
tection under the law are important to persons of African descent who
have historically fought for every right they now enjoy. Judicial and gov-
ernmental recognition of the rights of Black Freedmen, and opposition to
the discrimination being practiced against them, will go a long way in
righting the wrongs that have, for too long, kept Blacks from enjoying the
full rights given to them under the United States Constitution.
316. Id. at § 12.1 (explaining the concept of "state action" and expounding on the
idea that "[m]ost of the protections for individual rights and liberties contained in the
Constitution and its Amendments apply only to the actions of governmental agencies").
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